Abstract. We define and develop two-level type theory, a version of MartinLöf type theory which is able to combine two type theories. In our case of interest, the first of these two theories is homotopy type theory (HoTT) which may include univalent universes and higher inductive types. The second is a traditional form of type theory validating uniqueness of identity proofs (UIP) and may be understood as internalised meta-theory of the first. We show how two-level type theory can be used to address some of the open issues of HoTT, including the construction of "infinite structures" such as a universe of semi-simplicial types, and the internal definition of higher categorical structures. The idea of two-level type theory is heavily inspired by Voevodsky's Homotopy Type System (HTS). Two-level type theory can be thought of as a version of HTS without equality reflection. We show that the lack of equality reflection does not hinder the development of the ideas that HTS was designed for.
The literature on homotopy type theory (HoTT), and type theory in general, offers a great variety of results. Some developments are completely internal to a specific type theory, that is, they can be expressed in type-theoretic syntax and mechanised using a proof assistant which itself is an implementation of a sufficiently good approximation of the considered type theory. Examples include most of the material in the homotopy type theory textbook, many theorems of which have been formalised in the proof assistants Coq [10] , Agda [23] , and Lean [16] . A second kind of literature presents results of inherently meta-theoretic nature, for example the development of models of type theory, or proofs that a system is strongly normalising, and so on.
What we are particularly interested in is a third kind of results. Some developments are partially internal to homotopy type theory, and often one would want them to be completely internal and formalisable in a proof assistant, but unfortunately, it is either unknown how this is doable or it is known to be impossible. One example for this third kind is the work by Shulman on inverse diagrams [26] . This work shows that, if we have a category C with some properties (in the metatheory), we can consider certain type-valued diagrams over C, and there will even be a type of such diagrams. Note that C is not a variable that we can quantify over inside the type theory: it is assumed to be given externally. In other words, if we choose a concrete example of C, we can take a proof assistant, implement the type of these diagrams, and work with them internally. However, if C is variable in the meta-theory, this is not possible.
In this situation, a standard approach is to fix a (possibly arbitrary) model of type theory and work in the corresponding category, using categorical tools. This can sometimes lead to very elegant presentations. However, it can also make the exposition rather impenetrable, since it often requires mixing internal notions with external ones, and there may not always be a clean way to achieve that.
In the mentioned work by Shulman [26] , the role of the model of HoTT is played by a type-theoretic fibration category (TTFC), and most of the results of the paper are formulated at that level, that is, as categorical constructions within a particular TTFC. This requires changing style of presentation compared to a more "traditional" type-theoretic exposition, like for example that of the standard textbook on HoTT [28] . For instance, one has to work with morphisms rather than terms, fibrations rather than families of types, talk about pullbacks rather than just performing substitutions, and use "diagrammatic" instead of "equational" reasoning techniques. Although these stylistic variations are not necessarily bad in themselves, the fact that one is essentially forced to apply them can lead to difficulties. A testament to that is the fact that, on occasions, the author chooses to fall back to the internal language to formulate certain definitions and properties, as this is much easier than expressing them in a traditional category-theoretic form.
Another disadvantage of the meta-theoretic presentation is that it is not entirely clear how to formalise it in a proof assistant in the style of Coq, Agda, or Lean. The most direct approach to formalisation would consist of encoding the notion of "model" of type theory first, then use it to express both the internal and external levels of a construction. Clearly, such an approach is not only extremely laborious and cumbersome, but also misses out on most of the features of the formalisation tool, since the internal language of the target type theory is not expressed directly, but it is realised through its interpretation in a model.
An attempt to resolve these issues is two-level type theory, first presented at the CSL conference by Altenkirch and two of the current authors [4] . This theory is inspired by and a variant of Voevodsky's Homotopy Type System (HTS) [30] , with some important differences.
One way to understand two-level type theory is to start with an ordinary theory (such as the theory considered in the homotopy type theory textbook [28] ), which we call the fibrant theory. The reason for this will become clear later. Then, we add parts of its meta-theory as an additional type-theoretic layer on top of it, and this richer theory (which includes all of the fibrant one) is called the strict theory. This makes it possible to remain within the confines of a type-theoretic language and still be able to perform constructions that would normally require external reasoning. The mentioned "mixing" of internal and external constructions becomes much less awkward: all our constructions take place in type theory, but only some types belong to the fibrant theory which represents HoTT.
Let us elaborate on two-level type theory from the point of view of a model. The approach is based on the notion of strict (sometimes also called exact) equality. Given two terms a, b of some type A in a model of type theory, we say that they are strictly equal if they are "externally" equal in the usual mathematical sense, i.e. if they denote the same value in the model. This notion is to be contrasted with that of weak equality, where the particular equality structure of the model is taken into account. Weakly equal terms are those for which there exists a term witnessing the corresponding equality type in the model. In particular, weak equality can be a non-trivial structure.
One can work with weak equality directly in the internal language of type theory. Some care is required because of the fact that terms can be equal in multiple ways, but this can be dealt with rather elegantly and efficiently, as demonstrated by the exposition of the textbook [28] . On the other hand, reasoning about strict equality of terms, by the very nature of the notion of strict equality, has to happen at the meta-level. This is where the first fundamental idea of our two-level type theory comes into play: we augment the language with a structure for expressing strict equality, and hence make it possible to move this particular example of metatheoretical reasoning back into the theory. Interestingly, it turns out that the expressive power gained by having an internal notion of strict equality is already enough to internalise some of the other known uses of meta-theoretical reasoning in HoTT, like the above-mentioned theory of Reedy-fibrations of inverse diagrams developed by Shulman [26] .
Syntactically, we can think of strict equality as an attempt to internalise what is usually called judgmental equality, while weak equality is, of course, the usual equality type of Martin-Löf type theory or homotopy type theory. Unfortunately, simply adding a "strict equality type former" is not enough. In fact, if we just equip it with the usual introduction and elimination rules of equality, it is easy to see that we get something that is provably equivalent to the existing (weak) equality structure of the theory, and of course we do not want to assume that weak and strictly equality coincide when working with HoTT.
Instead, mimicking the structure found in concrete "homotopical" models, such as the one based on simplicial sets [20] , two-level type theory has a subclass of types, called fibrant, which are the ones for which weak equality is defined as well-behaved.
Types that are not necessarily fibrant will be called "pretypes", to emphasise the fact that fibrant types are really the main object of study in two-level type theory. The intuition is that fibrant types are the usual types that are found in HoTT, whereas pretypes are what one gets if one is allowed to talk about strict equality internally. In particular, strict equality itself is usually not fibrant.
Before, we had said that we can think of two-level type theory as the fibrant theory with some parts of its meta-theory built on top of it, forming the (richer) strict theory. Now, we can also view it the other way round: We have a type theory which we take to be the strict theory, and call some of its types fibrant.
If we compare the two-level approach to a more traditional meta-theoretical presentation, only fibrant types can be directly mapped to types of a model, while non-fibrant ones correspond to meta-theoretical statements. This is particularly clear when considering strict equality: a pretype of the form a s = b, expressing the strict equality of terms a and b, can only be interpreted as the external statement declaring the fact that the two terms involved are the same in the model, and this statement cannot necessarily be thought of as a type.
Working with a formalism including a notion of "pretype" presents several advantages, the most apparent and directly useful perhaps being the fact that many constructions yield well defined results at a higher level of generality compared to a meta-theoretical setting. For example, a (small) diagram of types always has a limit, although of course we cannot in general guarantee that this limit is fibrant. Let us contrast this to the corresponding statement one can make when reasoning externally in terms of a model: if a diagram has a non-fibrant limit in our setting, that means it has no limit at all in the corresponding model. The possibility of working with a well-defined notion of limit (albeit not necessarily fibrant) makes many constructions more regular and easier to deal with (see, for example, the matching objects in Definition 13 below).
A further aspect of two-level type theory is that it offers a convenient framework to modify the fibrant theory, which in our case of interest is the type theory usually referred to as homotopy type theory. For example, consider natural numbers, which come in two version. First, there is the strict pretype of natural numbers, which corresponds to the external natural numbers that are not part of homotopy type theory. Second, there is the fibrant type of natural numbers, which is a type in homotopy type theory. By postulating that the pretype and the fibrant type are strictly isomorphic, we are able to perform certain constructions which are expected to be impossible in "standard homotopy type theory". Note that HTS does indeed identify strict and fibrant natural numbers, and we think that by postulating such an isomorphism, our two-level type theory gains the power of HTS while retaining a rather simple specification, and while this identification is hard-wired in HTS, the two-level system is kept variable. As far as we understand, a major motivation for HTS was the famous problem of internal semi-simplicial types which was first discussed at the special year on univalent foundations in Princeton (2012/13). With an isomorphism between strict an fibrant natural numbers, this and more general constructions can be performed in two-level type theory.
Related to this is the question in which sense the fibrant theory of two-level type theory corresponds to homotopy type theory. This, of course, depends on the precise formulation and choice of rules. A conservativity result can be found in the thesis of the second-named author [13] . Note that the current article does not focus on conservativity or the possibility to make homotopy type theory more expressive. Instead, it focuses on a demonstration of how the mixture of internal and external reasoning can be unified in the system. It would be possible to create a new proof assistant which implements two-level type theory. At the same time, it is a feature of the theory is that it is possible to use an existing proof assistant and directly encode the two-level structure without having to work with models in the formalisation. This makes the actual formalisation of our results feasible in current proof assistants. The basic idea is to take a proof assistant which implements, say, a type theory T. If T is sufficiently close to the strict theory of our two-level system (for example, Martin-Löf type theory with unique identity proofs), we can just take it as just that, meaning that the equality type of this theory will be our strict equality pretype. We can then implement some rules determining which of the "types" of T are fibrant, and construct a weak equality type inside. Note that a similar strategy for another variant of HTS has been used by Boulier and Tabareau [11] , although their development proceeds to a different direction from the one pursued in the present paper. One contribution of this article is our demonstration that this strategy allows the formalisation of many non-trivial results with current proof assistants. We have formalised many of the internalised results in this paper, using the proof assistant Lean.
1
The outline of the article is as follows. We recall and make precise the introduction to two-level type theory from the previous conference paper [4] . Section 2 is devoted to this. In particular, the differences to HTS (which is also based on the concepts of strict equality and fibrancy) are explained in Section 2.3. In Section 3, we discuss constructions related to Reedy fibrant diagrams, and thereby demonstrate how internal type-theoretic reasoning is unified with meta-theoretic arguments in our two-level system. As a further application of this, we present an approach to (∞, 1)-categories in Section 4 which can be in full be expressed in two-level type theory. In Section 5, we explain further the formalisation approach in Lean, and compare it to other attempts.
Two-Level Type Theory
In this section, we will specify our two-level system by giving a syntactical presentation of our base theory. Some aspects of the theory do not need to be fixed, allowing variations. What we get is thus a family of two-level theories.
The basic idea of two-level type theory is that it contains two separate but related fragments:
• a strict fragment, which is a form of traditional Martin-Löf type theory with intensional equality types and the principle of uniqueness of identity proofs (uip, also called Axiom K [27] ); • a fibrant fragment, which is essentially homotopy type theory, and contains univalent universes and potentially higher inductive typs [28] . When looking at the semantics of two-level type theory (see [13] ) , the presence of these two fragments is apparent. However, in the syntactical description below, the rules for the two fragments have to be introduced together, hence the clean separation between the two theories is slightly harder to spot.
2.1. Specification of two-level type theory. For our a precise specification, we choose a presentation in the style of the appendix in the homotopy type theory textbook [28, Appendix A.2] , which considers three forms of judgements: Γ ctx; Γ a : A; and Γ a ≡ a : A. Fortunately, we do not need to give all the rules, as most of them are identical to those given in [28, Appendix A.2] . Thus, in most cases, it is sufficient to state the difference in order to give both an understandable and a precise specification.
The fibrant fragment of the theory that we consider consists of the following basic types and type formers:
• Π, the type former of dependent functions;
• Σ, the type former of dependent pairs;
• +, the coproduct type former;
• 1, the unit type;
• 0, the empty type;
• N, the fibrant type of natural numbers; • =, the equality type (in the sense of HoTT);
• a hierarchy U 0 , U 1 , . . . of universes;
• possibly inductive and higher inductive types. The idea is that these types and type formers capture all of standard HoTT. For the developments in the current paper, inductive and higher inductive types will not be important. Furthermore, we have:
• + s , the strict coproduct; We assume all the usual judgemental rules (including the judgemental η-rule for Σ).
Further, the theory has a strict identity pretype, written s =. Again, the rules of s = are the standard ones:
together with the usual computation rule:
For pretypes A, B : U s i , we can form the pretype of strict isomorphisms, written A s B (unlike in HoTT, it is enough to have maps in both directions such that both compositions are pointwise strictly equal to the identity). However, we do not assume that U s i is univalent. Instead, we add rules corresponding to the principle of uniqueness of identity proofs uip and function extensionality funext as follows:
Note that, so far, we have not considered U i , +, 0, N, = at all. We do this now, and their rules are more subtle.
The first important rule is that any fibrant type (element of U i ) is also a pretype (element of U s i ), as given by the inference rule fib-pre below. This means that informally we can understand U i as a subtype of U s i . Now, let A and B be fibrant types, i.e.
Then, by fib-pre and by the formation rule of Π, we would have
. However, we add the rule that, under these conditions, the resulting type can be lifted to U i . That is, we add the rule pi-fib below stating that Π preserves fibrant types. In a completely analogous way, we add the rule sigma-fib for Σ.
We do not add a similar rule for + s . Consequently, the strict sum of two fibrant types is in general only a pretype.
Similarly, there is no special rule for
A, it does not matter whether A is a type or only a pretype, the expression a 1 s = a 2 is only an element of U s i , and generally not in U i .
In contrast, the equality type former = can only be applied to elements of fibrant types; i.e. its formation rule is given by the rule intro-= below. Note that there is no strict universe U s i involved.
The type a 1 = a 2 (with the constructor refl) is a pretype by rule fib-pre and can thus be compared with a 1 s = a 2 . However, these two equality pretypes are usually not the same. The elimination principle of = only works for families of fibrant types (not in general for pretypes). This means that the usual "path induction" principle, which allows us to construct an element of Π a1,a2:A Π p:a1=a2 P (a 1 , a 2 , p), can only be applied if P is a family of fibrant types, i.e.
In other words, the elimination principle of the fibrant equality type = looks very similar to the rule for the strict equality pretype elims =, but all labels "s" are removed.
If we restrict ourselves to fibrant types, we can do everything that we can do in HoTT. In particular, we can say what it means for a function between types to be an equivalences (using =). We assume that the universes U 0 , U 1 , . . . are univalent, that is, the canonical map from type of equalities A = B to the type of equivalences A B (defined as usual in homotopy type theory) is an equivalence itself.
Similarly, the type former + only allows us to form a type A + B if A and B are (fibrant) types (i.e. elements of some U i ), and we can only define a function
with the usual induction principle if P is a family of types.
We have the type of natural numbers N : U 0 (in any context) with the constructors 0, succ, and its induction principle can only be applied to eliminate into families of types. The same holds for the type 0.
It is possible to add further rules to the theory, such as those for higher inductive types, simply by replicating their usual formulations in HoTT (see for example [28, Section A.3.2] ), and making sure that all the types involved, both in the formation and in the elimination rules, be fibrant. We do not need higher inductive types for this paper.
We will usually omit universe levels and simply write U s or U instead of U s i or U i in the same style as it is done in [28] .
Remark 1. The rules of the system mean that it is in general easier eliminate from pretypes into fibrant types than vice versa. The intuition is that the fragment of fibrant types represents a type theory, while the pretypes allow us to reason about part of the meta-theory of the fibrant fragment. For example, we can observe the following:
(i) If A is a fibrant type with elements a 1 , a 2 : A, then we can form both the fibrant type a 1 = a 2 and the pretype a 1 s = a 2 . By "strict path induction" (i.e. an application of J s ), we can easily construct a function i : a 1 s = a 2 → a 1 = a 2 (note that a 1 and a 2 are arguments of i which are omitted for readability). Consequently, strictly equal elements of a type are also ("homotopy"-) equal. This corresponds to the fact that judgemental equality in HoTT implies equality ("refl"). We will sometimes omit applications of this conversion function from our notation, and implicitly regard witnesses of strict equalities as fibrant. We cannot construct a function in the other direction, as the path induction principle J can only be applied to eliminate into types, which a 1 s = a 2 is not. Hence, equal elements are not necessarily strictly equal. However, if we have a type which does satisfy this "equality reflection" principle, it is easy to see that the type is a set in the sense of homotopy type theory.
(ii) There is an obvious function N s → N, definable by induction on N s . Note that N s is the internalised version of the external set of natural numbers in an ordinary type theory, and we can view it as a type of numerals. From any numeral, we can get a natural number; but from a natural number, we cannot necessarily get a numeral. (iii) Similarly, we can construct a function 0 s → 0, but not a function in the opposite direction. Intuitively, from an inconsistency in the theory, we cannot conclude that the meta-theory is inconsistent.
2.2. Possible Variations. As described above, an obvious way to find variations of our two-level theory would be to add different type formers to the strict or the fibrant fragment. For example, higher inductive-inductive types have been considered a few times in HoTT (see e.g. [28, 6, 5] ). These are at the current stage an experimental feature, the rules and consistency of which is not completely clear (technically, the same could be said for higher inductive types). However, if one assumes that these concepts make sense are are consistent in HoTT, then there is no reason for not assuming them to make sense in the fibrant fragment of our two-level system, since some standard models of HoTT can also be seen as models of our two-level theory (see [13] ).
A question which is much more specific to our setting is the following. After the presentation given above, one might wonder why we have made a distinction between, say, 0 s and its fibrant counterpart 0, but at the same time we have only one unit type 1. Similarly, we have strict and fibrant versions of +, N and equality, but only one version of Π and Σ.
If we start with the assumption that the two equality types for the strict and fibrant fragment must necessarily differ, then it is not clear which of the other type formers, if any, need to be split (we are not considering universes as type formers in the present discussion). In this presentation, we have chosen the approach of only unifying those type formers that would be the same up to judgemental isomorphism anyway. Those are precisely 1, Π and Σ, since they are defined by universal properties.
The other type formers could potentially be chosen to coincide as well by adding appropriate rules, similar to pi-fib and sigma-fib. We call such a version of twolevel type theory strong. We do not use a strong theory in this paper, since the present minimalistic theory suffices for our purposes, and it admits some interesting models that do not validate the strong version, including those used to derive the conservativity result in the thesis of the second-named author [13] .
There are further additional assumptions that one can make. For example, it seems harmless to close U under strict isomorphism, i.e. to assume that any pretype which is strictly isomorphic to a fibrant type is fibrant itself. In this paper, we say that such a pretype is essentially fibrant (see Section 3.1). However, in our Lean formalisation, we use the menioned closure axiom for convenience (see Section 5.1).
It is also quite natural to ask whether we could extend our theory with a fibrant replacement operation, allowing us to convert any type into its "closest" fibrant approximation.
In fact, it is not hard to give rules for a possible fibrant replacement type former:
The rules above express quite faithfully the idea of "replacing" a strict type with a fibrant approximation: given a strict type A, we can get a fibrant type RA, together with a function r : A → RA, and a universal property stating that, for any fibrant type P , to define a function RA → X all we need is to define a function A → X. In fact, a fibrant replacement type former is quite similar to the propositional truncation operation, only, of course, it makes types fibrant rather than propostional.
Having fibrant replacement in the theory would make a lot of constructions easier, and at first glance it does appear justifiable semantically, since it seems quite straightforward to build models of two-level type theory based on Quillen model categories, which are indeed equipped with a very similar operation.
A type former along these lines is considered in [12] , where the authors construct a model structure on a universe of strict types using fibrant replacement.
Unfortunately, it turns out that the fibrant replacement operation cannot actually be internalised, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 2. Assume the existence of a fibrant replacement type former R, as defined by the rules form-R to comp-R. Then every fibrant type is a set.
Proof. Let A be a fibrant type. Recall from Remark 1 that, for any x, y : A, we have i : x s = y → x = y. We claim that, for any x, y : A and p : x = y, we have
(
Since (1) is fibrant, we can apply path induction and assume p ≡ refl x . For h : (1), we get R(refl x = p), and consequently refl x = p, i.e. A is a set.
Differences with HTS.
Although our two-level theory is inspired by Voevodsky's HTS [30] , and shares many of its features and motivations, there are some substantial differences between the two systems.
Probably the most important difference is that HTS assumes that natural numbers, binary sums and the empty type in the fibrant fragment can eliminate to arbitrary types. This is, for example, the case if the coercion from fibrant to strict types preserves those type formers. In Section 2.1, we called such a theory strong. This assumption is not necessary for the development that follows, although it could be used to perform more general internal constructions, such as a fibrant classifier for (untruncated) semi-simplicial types.
Another fundamental difference is that HTS assumes the reflection rule for equality in the strict fragment, while our theory only requires that strict equality satisfies uip. From a semantic point of view, the former is a completely unproblematic assumption, and in fact it is satisfied by the models considered in [13] , since equality in presheaf categories does validate the reflection rule.
However, systems with equality reflection seem to be much harder to study from a meta-theoretical point of view, and consequently harder to implement. Although most of the current implementation efforts for proof assistants based on MartinLöf type theory do not include equality reflection, there have been recent attempts at developing a system within which something like HTS could potentially be realised [8] .
In practice, lack of a reflection rule for strict equality does not seem to be a big hurdle when reasoning within a two-level system informally. Of course, formalising proofs in a proof assistant could potentially be made easier by not having to manually manage rewrites along equality witnesses, but our experience with the Lean [16] proof assistant (see Section 5) leads us to believe that a system that replaces reflection with simply uip is not any less practical for the formalisation of results based on a two-level theory.
Finally, universes in the strict fragment of our system are not assumed to be fibrant types, like in HTS. In some variations of HTS, universes of strict types are even assumed to be contractible. This is motivated by their interpretation in the simplicial set model [20] . We do not make any such assumption in two-level type theory.
Reedy Fibrant Diagrams
In this section, we will introduce the basic categorical infrastructure, within the language of two-level type theory, required for later parts of the paper. This is a first demonstration of results which be expressed in full in two-level type theory although they would require meta-theoretic reasoning in more traditional approaches.
We define the notion of Reedy fibration, and show that Reedy fibrant diagrams I → U have limits in U for a finite inverse category I. This is an internalised version of Shulman's results which can be found in [26] .
In the second half of this section, we describe how to construct Reedy fibrant replacements, discuss classifiers for Reedy fibrations (a special case of which would be the type of n-truncated semi-simplicial types), and finally, we prove useful lemmas about exponentials of diagrams.
3.1. Essentially Fibrant Pretypes and Fibrations. As a preparation for our "more abstract" sample applications of the 2-level theory, we remark that it is often not necessary to know that a pretype A : U s is a fibrant type. Instead, it is usually sufficient to have a fibrant type B : U and a strict isomorphism A s B. If this is the case, we say that A is essentially fibrant. Clearly, every fibrant type is also an essentially fibrant pretype.
Recall that, in usual type-theoretic terminology, Fin n is the finite type with n elements. In two-level type theory, for a strict natural number n : N s , we have the finite type Fin s n . If we have inductive types in the strict fragment, we can define it as usual, but we do not need to: we can simply define it as the pretype of strict natural numbers smaller than n. Similarly, we have a fibrant type Fin n (note that a strict natural number can always be seen as a fibrant natural number, but not vice versa). In a strong two-level theory, Fin s n and Fin n coincide, but in general, we do not assume this (it only follows for n s = 1 from our assumptions). We say that a pretype I is finite if we have a number n : N s and a strict isomorphism I s Fin s n . Lemma 3. Let I be a finite pretype and X : I → U a family of fibrant types. Then, Π i:I X(i) is essentially fibrant.
Proof. Finiteness gives us a cardinality n on which we do induction. If n is 0 s , then Π i:I X(i) is strictly isomorphic to the unit type. Otherwise, we have a finite I such that f : 1 + s I s I, and Π i:I X(i) is strictly isomorphic to X(f (inl )) × Π i:I X(f (inr i)), which is finite by the induction hypothesis.
Similar to essential fibrancy, we have the following definition:
Definition 4 (fibration). Let p : E → B be a function (with E, B : U s ). We say that p is a fibration for all b : B, the fibre of p over b, i.e. the pretype Σ (e : E) . p(e) s = b, is essentially fibrant.
Note that, in the above definition, we are talking about the strict fibre, but there is no risk of confusion: the "homotopy fibre" (with fibrant equality instead of strict equality) does not exist, since B is not assumed to be a fibrant type.
Remark 5. Equivalently to Definition 4 above, we can say that a function p : E → B is a fibration if and only if there exists a fibrant type family F : B → U such that E is isomorphic to Σ B F , and the composition of this isomorphism with p is strictly equal to the projection Σ B F → B. In particular, any such fibrant family F gives rise to a fibration E → B. This characterisation allows us to assume that a given fibration has the form of a projection.
Note that we talk about a fibrant type family F . We could instead have asked for the seemingly weaker condition that F be a family B → U s which is pointwise essentially fibrant. Indeed, if we start with Definition 4 and define F by taking the fibres, then this is what we get. However, if we know that every F (b) is essentially fibrant, i.e. isomorphic to a type in U, we can simply compose F with this family of isomorphisms to get the family B → U.
Lemma 6. Let I be a finite pretype, E, B : I → U s two families of pretypes, and p : Π i:I (E i → B i ) a family of fibrations. Then the induced map
Proof. Assume we are given f : Π I B. The fibre of f along the map p • _ is
which, using function extensionality and the "distributivity equivalence" of Σ and Π, can be rewritten as
be the family of fibres of p as in Remark 5. The type (3) can then be written as
which is essentially fibrant by Lemma 3.
Strict Categories.
We define strict categories in much the same way as the precategories are defined in [28] , but the important bit to note is that we use the strict layer of the two-level system. This means in particular that the laws are formulated using strict equality. Since strict equality satisfies uip and thus does not suffer from coherence issues, this notion of category is well-behaved. It can be applied to structures which do not have fibrant types of objects or morphisms.
The precise definition presents no surprises:
Definition 7 (category). A strict category (or simply category) C is given by • a pretype |C| : U s of objects; • for all pairs x, y : |C|, a pretype C(x, y) : U s of arrows or morphisms; • an identity arrow id : C(x, x) for every object x;
• and a composition function • : C(y, z) → C(x, y) → C(x, z) for all objects x, y, z; • such that the usual categorical laws holds, that is, we have f • id
We say that a strict category is fibrant if the pretype of objects and the family of morphisms are fibrant.
In the following, we will usually drop the attribute "strict" and simply talk about categories.
A canonical example of a category is the category of pretypes, whose objects are the pretypes in a given universe U s , and morphisms are functions. By slight abuse of notation, we write U s for this category. Analogously, if C is a category, we allow ourselves to denote the pretype of objects by C itself.
The usual theory of categories can be reproduced in the context of our categories (at least as long as we stay constructive). In particular, one can define the notions of functor, natural transformation, limits, adjunctions in the obvious way, or show that limits (if they exist) are unique up to isomorphism, and so on.
Remark 8. In order to be careful with sizes, we can say that C is a category of size (i, j) if |C| : U s i and C(x, y) : U s j (for all x, y). For example, a reasonable notion of a locally small category could be one of size (1, 0), while a small category would be of size (0, 0).
However, it is more useful to understand smallness as a relative notion instead. For example, in Lemma 11, we say that U s has small limits, meaning that the objects and morphisms of the index category have to be in U s , but recall that U s can be any universe U s i (and the statement does in fact not depend on the specifically chosen structure of the universe hierarchy).
We will from now on omit all universe levels, but we will strive to make clear relative size differences when they occur.
In the context of Reedy fibrations, an important categotical construction is the following one:
Definition 9 (reduced coslice). Given a category C and an object x : C, the reduced coslice x C is the full subcategory of non-identity arrows in the coslice category x/C. A concrete definition is the following. The objects of x C are triples of an y : |C|, a morphism f : C(x, y), and a proof ¬ p * (f )
Note that we have a "forgetful functor" forget : x C → C, given by the first projection on objects as well as on morphisms.
Further, a class of categories that is important for us are the so-called inverse categories. They are often characterised as dual to direct categories, which in turn can be described as not having an infinite sequence of non-identity arrows as in →→→ · · · . We choose to not go via direct categories and instead define inverse categories directly, and restrict ourselves to those that have heigt at most ω. To stay constructive, we also require an explicitly given rank function.
Consider the category (N s ) op which has n : N s as objects, and
s is defined in the canonical way). Then, we define:
Definition 10 (inverse category). We say that a category C is an inverse category if there is a functor ϕ : C → (N s ) op which reflects identities; i.e. if we have f : C(x, y) and ϕ x s = ϕ y , then we also have p : x s = y and p * (f ) s = id y . We call ϕ the rank functor, and say that an object i : |C| has rank ϕ(i). We write C <n for the full subcategory of C consisting of objects of rank less than n.
Note that reflecting identities usually means that f is an identity whenever ϕ(f ) is. In (N s ) op , a morphism is an identity if and only if its domain and codomain coincide. Note that the expression f s = id y does not type-check, and to remedy this, we have to transport f along a strict equality between x and y, using the notation p * (f ) from [28] .
3.3. Reedy Fibrant Limits. Recall that our first example of a category was a strict universe U s of pretypes and functions. Much of what is known about the category of sets in traditional category theory holds for U s . For example, the following result translates rather directly:
Lemma 11. The category U s has all small limits, where small means that the corresponding diagram has an index category whose objects and morphisms are pretypes in U s .
Proof. Let C be a category with |C| : U s and C(x, y) : U s (for all x, y). Let X : C → U s be a functor. We define L to be the pretype of natural transformations 1 → X, where 1 : C → U s is the constant functor on 1. Clearly, L : U s , and a routine verification shows that L satisfies the universal property of the limit of X.
Unfortunately, the category U of fibrant types is not as well-behaved. Even pullbacks of fibrant types are not fibrant in general (but see Lemma 12) . Since U is a subcategory of U s , a functor X : C → U can always be regarded as a functor C → U s , and we always have a limit in U s . If this limit happens to be essentially fibrant, we say that X has a fibrant limit. Since U is a full subcategory of U s , this limit will then be a limit of the original diagram C → U.
Lemma 12. The pullback of a fibration E → B along any function f : A → B is a fibration.
Proof. We can assume that E is of the form Σ (b : B) . C(b) and p is the first projection. Clearly, the first projection of Σ (a : A) . C(f (a)) satisfies the universal property of the pullback.
Lemma 12 makes it possible to construct fibrant limits of certain "well-behaved" functors from inverse categories. We follow Shulman [26] , but our setup allows a slightly more general development. We will give a short analysis after the proof of Theorem 15.
In the following, we always assume that C is an inverse category.
Definition 13 (matching object; see [26, Chapter. 11] ). Let X : C → U s be a functor. For any z : C, we define the matching object M X z to be the limit of the composition z C
Definition 14 (Reedy fibrations; see [26, Def. 11.3] ). Let X, Y : C → U s be two diagrams (functors). Further, assume p : X → Y is a natural transformation. We say that p is a Reedy fibration if, for all z : C, the canonical map
induced by the universal propery of the pullback, is a fibration.
A diagram X is said to be Reedy fibrant if the canonical map X → 1 is a Reedy fibration, where 1 is of course the diagram that is constantly the unit type.
Using this definition, we can make precise the claim that we can construct fibrant limits of certain well-behaved diagrams. The following theorem is (probably) the most involved result that is available in our formalisation:
Theorem 15 (see [26, Lemma 11.8] ). Assume that C is an inverse category with a finite type of objects |C|. Assume further that X : C → U s is a Reedy fibrant diagram which is pointwise essentially fibrant (which means we may assume that it is given as a diagram C → U).
Then, X has a fibrant limit.
Proof. By induction on the cardinality of |C|. In the case |C| s Fin s 0 , the limit is the unit type.
Otherwise, we have |C| s Fin s n+1 . Let us consider the rank functor
We choose an object z : C such that ϕ z is maximal; this is possible (constructively) due to the finiteness of |C|. Let us call C the category that we get if we remove z from C; that is, we set |C | :≡ Σ (x : |C|) . ¬(x s = z). Clearly, C is still inverse, and we have |C | s Fin s n .
Let X : C → U be Reedy fibrant. We can write down the limit of X explicitly as
Writing the pretype |C| as a coproduct 1 + s |C| , we get that the above pretype is strictly isomorphic to
Using that z has no incoming non-identity arrows (together with uip), two of the components of the above type are contractible and can be removed, leaving us with
Let us write L for the limit of X restricted to C , and let us further write p for the canonical map p :
This is the pullback of the span
By Reedy fibrancy of X, the map q is a fibration. Thus, by Lemma 12, the map from (8) to L is a fibration.
By the induction hypothesis, L is essentially fibrant. This implies that (8) is essentially fibrant, as it is the domain of a fibration whose codomain is essentially fibrant.
Note that, in the special case that the category C in Theorem 15 is discrete, we recover the statement of Lemma 3.
In Shulman's work [26] , the notion of a "pretype" does not exist, and every "type" is fibrant. This means that every diagram is valued in fibrant types (i.e. the corresponding condition of Theorem 15 is trivial). It also means that matching objects do not necessarily exist, and the definition of a Reedy fibration has to include the condition that all matching objects occurring in the definition are available.
If we wanted to precisely copy Shulman's definition of a Reedy fibration, we would have to add two conditions to Definition 14: first, that all occurring diagrams are valued in fibrant types; and second, that all occurring matching objects are essentially fibrant. Instead, we have given a more general and weaker definition.
Even if diagrams of fibrant types (C → U) are what we are ultimately interested in, the ability to talk about more general diagrams (C → U s ) is quite useful, as we will see later.
It also allows us to formulate some results in a more general way. Note that, in Theorem 15, we have not required that C be finite (the sets of morphisms are unrestricted), and we have not required the matching objects to be essentially fibrant, and it turned out that neither of these assumptions were necessary.
However, note the following simple consequence of Theorem 15:
Lemma 16. If C is an inverse category such that for each n : |C|, the category (n C) has a finite type of objects, and X : C → U s is Reedy fibrant, then X is valued in essentially fibrant pretypes and all matching objects are essentially fibrant.
Proof. We show by induction on the rank ϕ(n) of an object n : |C| that both X n and M X n are essentially fibrant. Assume X restricted to C <ϕ(n) is valued in essentially fibrant pretypes.
Assume that (i, f, p) is an object in the reduced coslice category n C (here, i : |C|, f : C(n, i), and p is just a proof that f is not an identity). Since C is inverse, we have that
"a coslice of a coslice is a coslice".
This implies that the composition
is Reedy fibrant, and by assumption, it is valued in essentially fibrant pretypes. By Theorem 15, the limit of (10) is thus essentially fibrant. This limit is by definition M X n . Since X is Reedy fibrant, we have a fibrant family F :
. F , and a Σ-type of essentially fibrant types is essentially fibrant.
We summarise this short discussion and the consequences of Lemma 16 as follows:
Remark 17. If the inverse category C in Theorem 15 is finite (i.e. all homsets are finite, not only the set of objects), then the Reedy fibrant diagram X : C → U s is automatically valued in essentially fibrant types, and all matching objects are essentially fibrant. We are then in the situation of Shulman [26] .
Note that [26, Lemma 11.8] makes a stronger statement than saying that a certain limit exists. Another point of the result is captured by our Lemma 23.
Similarly to the notation C <n (see Definition 10), we will denote by X|n the restriction of a diagram X : C → U s to C <n . The following lemma generalises Lemma 12 to diagrams:
Lemma 18 (see [26, Theorem 11.11] ). Let p : X → B be a Reedy fibration of diagrams over C, and f : A → B any map. Then the pullback of p along f is a Reedy fibration.
Proof. Suppose we have a pullback square:
where p is a Reedy fibration. We want to show that q is a Reedy fibration. Now fix an object n : |C|, and consider the cube:
: :
The front and back faces are pullbacks by construction, and the right face is a pullback because it is the limit of a pullback square. By a pullback pasting argument, the square determined by the front left and the back right vertical arrow is a pullback. By a second pullback pasting argument, the left face is a pullback. Now consider the diagram:
We have proved that the lower square is a pullback, and the outermost square is a pullback because limits in categories of diagrams are pointwise. It follows that the upper square is a pullback for all n : C, which shows that the map Y → A is a Reedy fibration.
Reedy Fibrant Factorisations.
The goal of the current section is to show that any strict functor X from an admissible inverse category C to U has a Reedy fibrant replacement; that is, we can construct a Reedy fibrant diagram which is equivalent to X in a suitable sense. More generally, given any map of U-valued diagrams, we can always factor it into a (level-wise) equivalence followed by a fibration.
We emphasise that we are talking about diagrams that are valued in fibrant types (or, equivalently, essentially fibrant pretypes). An obvious reason why this is necessary is that, for general diagrams valued in pretypes, the only notion of equivalence that we could use would be strict isomorphism, which clearly would be too strong. But even if we came up with a weak notion of equivalence of general diagrams, we could not expect it to be possible to start with any diagram C → U s and derive a Reedy fibrant one from it which is in some sense equivalent. Already in the special case that C is the discrete category with exactly one object, this would correspond to finding a fibrant replacement of a pretype. By Theorem 2 such a fibrant replacement cannot be defined internally. Thus, we stress that we construct Reedy fibrant replacements of type-valued diagrams, not fibrant replacements of pretypes.
Our construction is an internalisation of the known analogous construction in traditional mathematics (see e.g. [26, Lemma 11.10] or [24] ). The function i is an equivalence by contractibility of "singletons" (more precisely: types of the form Σ (y : Y ) . y 0 = y are contractible, for any fibrant type Y with element y 0 : Y ). Furthermore, p is a fibration, being a projection from a Σ-type.
The equation f s = p • i holds judgmentally.
We will refer to the type N constructed in the proof of lemma 19 as the mapping cocylinder of f . Definition 20. Let C be an inverse category. We say that C is admissible if, for all n : C, Reedy fibrant diagrams over the reduced coslice n C have a fibrant limit.
By an argument analogue to the one of Lemma 16, it does not matter, in the above definition, whether we talk of diagrams valued in pretypes or diagrams valued in fibrant types. The main example of an admissible inverse category is ∆ op + , the opposite of the simplex category restricted to strictly monotone maps. We can define it concretely as follows: 
Proof. Let y : lim Y be an arbitrary element of the limit. We can think of y as a natural transformation:
Now consider the following pullback of diagrams:
By Lemma 18, X[y] is a Reedy fibrant diagram, hence its limit is fibrant by the assumption on C. Since limits commute with pullbacks, we get a pullback diagram:
showing that the fibre of lim p over y is fibrant.
Lemma 24. Let f : X → Z be a natural transformation of diagrams over an admissible inverse category C. Then f can be factored as:
where i is an equivalence, and p is a Reedy fibration.
Proof. We will construct, by induction on the natural number n, a diagram Y (n) over C <n , and a factorisation of f :
where i (n) is an equivalence and p (n) is a Reedy fibration. For n = 0 there is nothing to construct, so assume the existence of Y (n) , and fix any object x : C of rank n + 1. The forgetful functor j x : x C → C factors through C <n , hence we can consider the composition Y (n) • j x and take its limit L. Note that L is not necessarily fibrant, but the map L → M Z x induced by p (n) is a fibration by Lemma 23 and the admissibility of C. By lemma 12, we get a fibration
is given by the projection from the mapping cocylinder, followed by a map of the universal cone of the limit L. The action of Y (n) on morphisms between objects of ranks n or less is defined to be the same as that of Y (n) . It is easy to see that those definitions make Y (n+1) into a diagram that extends Y (n) to objects of rank n + 1. We can also extend i (n) by defining i
Similarly, we define p
to be the composition of the projection from the mapping cocylinder with the map L × M Z x Z x → Z x defined above. The fact that p (n+1) is a Reedy fibration follows immediately from the construction, since L is exactly the matching object of Y (n+1) at x. To conclude the proof, we glue together all the Y (n) , i (n) and p (n) into a single diagram Y and natural transformations i, p. Clearly, p is a Reedy fibration, and i is an equivalence. Proof. Apply Lemma 24 with Z equal to the constant diagram on the unit type.
Classifiers for Reedy fibrations.
If C is admissible, we can give a more typetheoretic description of the pretype of Reedy fibrations over a given base diagram. For this section, let B be any type-valued diagram over C, where C is an admissible inverse category.
For any type-valued diagram Z, write ∂ : Z n → M Z n for the canonical projection to the matching object. Furthermore, if f : Z → W is any map, the induced map on the matching objects will be denoted with f :
We define a family of pretypes D n (B) indexed over the natural numbers, where D n (B) stands for the pretype of Reedy fibrations over B defined for indices in C of rank lower than n. At the same time, we define:
• an interpretation function [−] that maps an element X : D n (B) to a diagram on C <n ; • for all X : D n (B), a projection map p X : [X] → B realising X as a diagram over B. We set D 0 (B) to be the unit type, and
Clearly, if X is the only element of D 0 (B), [X] is set to be the empty diagram, whereas, in the inductive case, [X, Y ] is the diagram that coincides with X on objects of rank lower than n, while, if i is any object of C of rank exactly n:
The projection map p X : [X] → B is defined in the natural way: as the unique map of empty diagrams in the base case, and for (X, Y ) : D n+1 (B), the map p (X,Y ) coincides with p X on objects of rank lower than n, and for an object i of rank n, we set:
We will refer to elements of D n (B) as n-truncated Reedy fibrant families over B. The terminology is motivated by the following Lemma, where we denote by R n (B) the pretype of n-truncated Reedy fibrant diagrams over B.
Lemma 26. For all natural numbers n, there exist maps φ : D n (B) → R n (B) and ψ : R n (B) → D n (B) such that for all X : R n (B), φ(ψ(X)) is equivalent to X.
Proof. Immediate from the definition of Reedy fibration and the inductive construction of D n (B).
For statements like Lemma 26, it is rather unfortunate that our theory does not possess a notion of "weak equality" that can be applied to both fibrant and strict types.
Such a notion would make it possible to state a more powerful formulation of Lemma 26 much more directly (i.e. by simply saying that the two pretypes it talks about are equivalent).
It would probably be possible to include this generalised form of weak equality in the theory, but doing so would make both the semantic and syntactical formulations of two-level type theory more complicated, and it would invalidate certain models. Therefore, we refrain from doing so in the present paper, and leave this exploration as a possible future development.
Alternatively, it is possible to define an ad hoc notion of weak equality for pretypes that are explicitly written in terms of fibrant types and strict equality using basic type formers. As a simple example, consider a pretype like T :≡ Σ (x :
, where X is a fibrant type, f, g are functions X → Y , and Y is any pretype.
Then, given elements (x, p) and (y, q) in T , their weak equality type would be defined to be simply x = y. The idea is that the second components belong to a strict equality type, hence they are always trivially equal.
Similarly, we could define weak equality for R n (B) as equivalence, whereas for D n (B) we would need to give an elaborate inductive definition. With this setup, we could state Lemma 26 simply as an equivalence between the two pretypes, meaning that the two functions φ and ψ compose to identities up to the notion of equality just defined.
In any case, the idea of Lemma 26 is that we can think of D n (B) as a different representation of the pretype of n-truncated Reedy fibrant diagrams over B, which is equivalent to it in a somewhat weak sense. The formulation that we have given avoids the need to define ad hoc notions of weak equalities.
Let us now suppose that C has finite hom-sets, and for all natural numbers n, the subcategory C ≤n is finite. For example, this is true for ∆ op + and similar categories. In that case, we can conclude immediately by inspecting the definition and using Lemma 3 that D n (B) is fibrant. Therefore, we obtain a fibrant representation for the pretype of Reedy fibrant diagrams over any base diagram B.
In particular, this gives us a definition of a type of n-truncated semi-simplicial types by taking C to be ∆ op + , i.e. a fibrant type SST n :≡ D n (1) that classifies (n-truncated, Reedy fibrant) semi-simplicial diagrams in U. A similar, but more elementary, construction can be found in [19] and, again using two-level type theory, in [4] .
3.6. Exponents of Diagrams. As we have already remarked before Lemma 11, the category U s in our two-level setting behaves very much like the category of sets in a standard mathematical setting. In particular, for any small category D, the Yoneda functor y can be constructed and the Yoneda lemma can be formulated and proved as usual. F, G) .
In this section, we want to show that exponentials, or the pretype of natural transformations, are fibrant under some conditions. This will be useful later.
Definition 27. We say that a pretype A is cofibrant if the representable functor U s (A, −) preserves fibrations. If f : A → B is a function, we say that f is a cofibration if there exists a cofibrant pretype A c , and a function g : A c → B, such that the map
is a strict isomorphism.
If f : A → B is a cofibration, we will refer to the cofibrant pretype A c appearing in Definition 27 as the complement of A in B. Note that, in particular, cofibrations are strict monomorphisms.
Lemma 28. Let A be a finite pretype, and B : A → U a fibrant family over A. Then the type Σ A B is cofibrant. In particular, finite pretypes and fibrant types are cofibrant.
Proof. Let p : X → Y be any fibration. For all a : A, the map
is easily seen to be a fibration, hence by Lemma 6 we get that the map
is a fibration. We can now conclude by observing that this map is strictly isomorphic to the exponential of p with Σ A B.
Now it follows immediately that finite pretypes are cofibrant (it suffices to take B to be the constant family on the unit type), and that fibrant types are also cofibrant (since they can be regarded as Σ types of families over the unit type).
Lemma 29. Let f : A → B be a cofibration, and p : X → Y a fibration. Then the induced map
is a fibration.
Proof. Let A c be the complement of A in B. Consider the following diagram:
Where the bottom-left square is a pullback. The bottom-right and outer squares are also pullbacks because B s A + A c , therefore we get that the upper square is a pullback as well. Now, the upper-right vertical map is a fibration by Lemma 28, hence so is the upper-left vertical map by Lemma 12, as required.
We will say that a natural transformation τ : F → G of diagrams over a category C is a cofibration if it is so pointwise, i.e. for all objects n : C, the map τ n : F (n) → G(n) is a cofibration. Caveat: we do not in general get a diagram F c by taking the complement pointwise.
We will now prove that, for diagrams over an inverse category, the exponential of a Reedy fibrant diagram along a cofibration is a Reedy fibration; however, we will need to establish a few techical preliminaries, first.
If C is a category, we define a new category C * , which is obtained from C by adding a single extra object * , and a single morphism * → x for all objects x : C * . It is easy to verify that composition and identities can be extended to C * , so that C is a full subcategory of C * , and * is an initial object 2 . Note that, if C is inverse, so is C * .
Lemma 30. Let C be a small inverse category, and F, G, X diagrams on C * . Let τ : F → G be a natural transformation such that τ * : F ( * ) → G( * ) is a cofibration, and assume that the canonical map X( * ) → lim C X is a fibration. Then the map
Proof. Set P = Nat C (G, X) × Nat C (F,X) Nat C * (F, X). An element of P can be thought of as a "partial" natural transformation G → X, which is defined on all of G(n) for objects n : C, but only on the "subtype" F ( * ) of G( * ).
Given such an f : P , to extend it to all of G( * ) amounts to giving a function g : G( * ) → X( * ) that coincides with f on F ( * ), and such that, for all n : C, the diagram
commutes. By taking a limit, the conditions expressed by the diagram (11) for all n : C can be collectively expressed by the commutativity of the diagram:
Therefore, if we set
it follows that the following diagram:
is a pullback. Since the right vertical map is a fibration by Lemma 29, we get that the left vertical map is also a fibration, as required.
We are now ready to prove our main result:
Theorem 31. Let τ : F → G be a cofibration of diagrams on an inverse category C, and X a Reedy fibrant diagram. Then the canonical natural transformation:
is a Reedy fibration.
Proof. Let n : C be any object. We have to show that the map:
is a fibration. We write G ↑ to denote the functor n/C → C → U s obtained by composing G with the forgetful functor n/C → C. Similarly for F and X. We will use the same notation for restricting a functor to the reduced coslice, since it will be clear from the context which one is meant. From the construction of the exponential via Yoneda, one can easily verify that, for all objects n : C,
We will now prove a similar formula for M n ([G, X]). Recall that an object of n/C is a triple (i, f, p) (where p is witnessing that f is not the identity morphism). Let us observe that, since C is inverse, the coslice category of n C over an object (i, f, p) is isomorphic to i/C, that is,
Therefore, we have:
We can now compute M n ([G, X]) as follows:
And, of course, a similar isomorphism holds if G is replaced with F . Using these isomorphisms, the function in (12) becomes
From the observation that n/C is isomorphic to (n C) * and Lemma 30, we get that (15) is a fibration, as required.
Corollary 32. Let τ : F → G be a cofibration of diagrams on an inverse category C, and X a Reedy fibrant diagram. Suppose further that all Reedy fibrant diagrams on C have fibrant limits. Then the natural map Nat(G, X) → Nat(F, X) is a fibration.
Proof. We know from Theorem 31 that
is a Reedy fibration. Since Reedy fibrant diagrams on C have fibrant limits, we get
s Nat(G, X), and the conclusion follows immediately from Lemma 23.
Corollary 33. Let X be a Reedy fibrant diagram over an inverse category C, and F a pointwise cofibrant diagram. Then [F, X] is Reedy fibrant. If furthermore Reedy fibrant diagrams on C have fibrant limits, then Nat(F, X) is fibrant.
Proof. Simply apply Theorem 31 and Corollary 32 to the cofibration 0 s → F .
An Application: Complete Semi-Segal Types
The development of Reedy fibrant diagrams in Section 3 constitutes an example of results which can be formalised in our two-level theory. In this section, we want to go further and explain how those results themselves can be used for an approach to higher category theory. This approach makes use of semi-Segal types, an idea that was presented by Altenkirch and two of the current authors in a talk in 2016 [3] . Here, we explain how the idea can be implemented in a two-level system. We start with an introduction and motivation in Section 4.1, develop some technical terms in 4.2, before we finally formulate the notion of complete semi-segal types and some of their properties in 4.3. A special case of ∞-groupoids is discussed in 4.5.
4.
1. An Approach to (∞, 1)-Categories. Category theory in homotopy type theory (or, equivalently, in the fibrant fragment of our two-level theory) is an important and frequently considered topic. Best known is probably the development of ordinary category theory ("univalent categories") by Ahrens, Kapulkin, and Shulman [1] . However, as types carry the structure of ∞-groupoids [21, 29] , higher categorical structure arises naturally and ordinary categories are in many situations not sufficient for capturing the algebraic complexity of commonly occurring objects. For example, the universe of fibrant types is not a univalent category in the sense of [1] , although it can be regarded as a "strict" category in the sense of Definition 7.
There have so far been few attempts to give an internal definition of "category" that is able to cover basic examples such as the category of fibrant types and results of simple categorical constructions performed on it, such as, for instance, the category of elements of a type-valued functor, or its category of algebras. Cranch [15] has shown how to work with concrete higher categories, which are expressive enough to capture some of those examples, but something as simple as a category of pointed types falls outside of the scope of that work.
In the current section, we want to demonstrate a new approach to (∞, 1)-categories using our two-level theory and the previously developed ideas on Reedy fibrant diagrams. What we propose are complete semi-Segal types, that is, Reedy fibrant diagrams ∆ op + → U s satisfying certain (propositional) conditions. The first of these conditions is the Segal condition, stating that an n-dimensional simplex is up to homotopy determined by its "spine", i.e. by its vertices (0-cells) and some of its edges (1-cells). The second condition is the completeness condition, essentially an adapted version of the "univalence" condition of univalent categories.
Our suggestion is inspired by models for higher categories in traditional settheory based mathematics:
(1) A common model for ∞-categories are simplicial sets satisfying the property that all inner horns have fillers [22] , i.e. certain liftings exist. We can show that our semi-Segal types do not only have these liftings, but they are actually unique (up to homotopy). However, as we replace simplicial sets by semi -simplicial types, this model is not the best for a comparison. [18] shows that one can equip a category of (marked) semiSegal spaces with a model structure that is Quillen-equivalent to that of complete Segal spaces. This implies that one can get away without having to add the whole degeneracy structure from the beginning. The fundamental aspect of our two-level type theory that makes this development possible is the possibility of constructing and working with algebraic objects comprising infinite towers of coherence conditions, as we have shown in Section 3.
Semi-simplicial types represent the most fundamental of those objects, and a basis on which to build more complex and directly useful structures.
Therefore, our plan is to define the notion of semi-Segal type based on semisimplicial types, and use it to manage the combinatorial complexity of (∞, 1)-semicategories internally. Semi-Segal spaces [18] , which serve as the main inspiration for our construction, can, to a certain extent, be thought of as the special case obtained when the model we are working on happens to be the simplicial model (see [13] ).
The caveat here is that, as noted in Section 3.3, the category of simplicial sets is much richer, in terms of strict categorical structure, than what we get to see when working from within type theory. In particular, we remarked that the lack of colimits in the formulation of two-level type theory that we adopted makes it really hard (and perhaps impossible) to reproduce the theory of diagrams over general Reedy categories.
That is why we cannot hope for a well-behaved theory of Segal types, and we instead settle for the weaker notion of semi-Segal type, which means that we cannot directly model higher categories equipped with identity morphisms, but only semicategory-like structures.
Fortunately, a rich theory can be developed nonetheless. In fact, the notion of completeness, which superficially seems to require the presence of degeneracies in the underlying simplicial type, can actually be defined for semi-Segal types (Definition 43).
4.2.
Simplices, Spines, and Horns. Let X : ∆ op + → U s be a semi-simplicial type, i.e. a Reedy fibrant diagram. It will be important to talk about things like the "type of n-simplices" in X, the "type of (n, k)-horns" in X (which intuitively is the type of n-simplices with two cells removed), or the "type of generalised horns", i.e. "simplices with certain cells removed". Of course, the type of n-simplices is given by X n , but horns and other sub-simplices are more tricky.
In our two-level type theory, the most natural way to define these types is to consider the relevant subfunctor of the Yoneda functor (for ∆ op + ), and then take the type of natural transformations from this functor to X. To spell it out explicitly, the Yoneda functor ∆ n : ∆ op + → U s on objects given as
and on morphisms by function composition. We can write (16) in the form
where we read the unit type 1 as the trivial condition. A subfunctor of ∆ n can then be constructed by replacing this empty condition by another proposition involving f , which we can write as ϕ(f ). More precisely: Assume n is fixed. Assume further we have a family of propositions 
This allows us to construct a functor Φ :
on objects, and the rule (19) ensures that the functor can act on morphisms by function composition, which is the only possibility as we want to define a subfunctor of ∆ n . In our case, it is sufficient to restrict ourselves to decidable propositions ϕ(f ). This is not surprising: the set of objects of ∆ op + is N, which has decidable equality, and all homsets are function types between finite types, again with decidable equality.
As discussed, the point of a subfunctor Φ of ∆ n is that it gives rise to a "generalised horn" in our two-level system. This "generalised horn" in the semi-simplicial type X (or, more precisely, the type of such horns) is given as
Let us look at some specific subfunctors of ∆ n (or equivalently, the families of propositions generating them), and the structures they define. First of all, an nsimplex corresponds to a "full tetrahedron" without any missing cell, i.e. to the functor ∆ n , and indeed it is straightforward to replicate the Yoneda lemma in our system, implying Nat(∆ n , X) s X n . We can define a family of propositions as in (18) above by setting
The subfunctor generated by µ is given as
The type Nat(M, X) can be thought of as the type of full boundaries of n-dimensional tetrahedra in X. We are already familiar with this shape: it is nothing else than the matching object, and one can indeed show Nat(M, X) s M X n . The next important shape is that of a horn. Assume that n is positive, n ≡ 1+n , allowing us to write n−1. Assuming we further have a number j ≤ n, we can define
We define a family of propositions λ n j by
Note that strict equality of functions [j]
s is exactly two cases, namely if f is either σ j or the identity on [n]. The generated functor Λ
represents the type of (n, j)-horns in X: an element of Nat(Λ n j , X) can be pictured as an n-tetrahedron with two missing cells.
By the spine of a simplex, we mean the sequence of adjacent 1-cells starting from the first and ending with the last vertex of the simplex. In particular, the type of spines does not contain any simplices of dimensions higher than 1. To make this precise, we define a family sp n of propositions by
(we write 0, 1 for the objects of [1] )
from which we construct the functor Sp n as a subfunctor of ∆ n . An n-spine in X is then, of course, simply an element of Nat(Sp n , X). Subfunctors of ∆ n form a preorder. If we use subfunctors generated by families of decidable propositions, it is not surprising that we can easily perform standard finite constructions. For two decidable propositions ϕ and ψ, we can find a proposition expressing ϕ ∨ ψ for example by taking ϕ × ψ + ¬ϕ × ψ + ϕ × ¬ψ (note that we did not assume propositional truncation for the strict layer of our theory, which would have made an easier definition possible). This means that we can form the coproduct of subfunctors Φ and Ψ which happen to be generated by ϕ and ψ, and so on.
Complete Semi-Segal Types.
Definition 34. Let X be a Reedy fibrant semi-simplicial type, F, G : ∆ op + → U s two diagrams, and τ : F → G a cofibration. We say that X is local with respect to τ if the fibration
It is easy to see that, if X is local with respect to τ : F → G and σ : G → H, then it is also local with respect to σ • τ . If X is local with respect to τ , it is also local with respect to any pushout of τ (pushout in the category of diagrams ∆ op + → U s ). We will be interested in particular in the case where F and G are instantiated with the diagrams considered in Section 4.2, such as Λ n j and Sp n . Note that these are pointwise finite and even globally finite (i.e. they become 0 s for objects above a certain degree), hence cofibrant, and all the various inclusions are cofibrations.
Definition 35 (Segal condition). We say that a Reedy fibrant semi-simplicial type X satisfies the Segal condition, or alternatively that X is a semi-Segal type, if X is local with respect to the inclusion Sp n → ∆ n for every n.
Note that if X is any semi-simplicial type (not necessarily Reedy fibrant, but still pointwise fibrant), we can still express an equivalent formulation of the Segal condition. Namely, if s, t : X 1 → X 0 are the two morphisms of the semi-simplicial structure of X, we define a type of weak n-spines in X as follows:
where our use of the fibrant equality ensures that this type is fibrant. Now we have the following result.
Lemma 36. Let X be a semi-simplicial type. Then the Reedy fibrant replacement of X satisfies the Segal condition if and only if the canonical maps X n → S X n are equivalences.
Proof. If Y is the fibrant replacement of X, we can assume Y 0 = X 0 , and that the fibre of Y 1 over an element (x 0 , x 1 ) of the matching object M One can then see that the type S X n is equivalent to the type of spines in X, hence the condition on the maps X n → S X n is equivalent to the Segal condition on Y . Thanks to Lemma 36, we can extend the notion of semi-Segal type to semsimplicial types that are not Reedy fibrant. This is mostly useful when constructing examples, as it is often easier to check the Segal condition before taking a fibrant replacement. We will sometimes improperly refer to the condition of Lemma 36 for a general semi-simplicial type as the Segal condition.
The following is a technical lemma that will be used in the proof of Lemma 38 below.
Lemma 37. The inclusion Sp n → Λ n k can be factored as a composition
n , with n < n, where the pushouts are taken in the category of diagrams
is an inner horn (0 < k < n), then we can find a factorisation that only involves pushouts of inner horns (i.e. 0 < k < n in each step).
Proof. Let P be a partially ordered set. A subset of P said to be a sieve if it is downwards-closed, i.e. for all x ∈ P , and y ≤ x, we have that y ∈ P . Dually, upwards-closed subsets of P will be called cosieves.
In this proof, we will denote by [a, b] the set of natural numbers i with a ≤ i ≤ b; a number i is said to be internal to a set of natural numbers S if it belongs to S and is not either its maximum or minimum. Furthermore, for any set A, we will write ℘ (A) for the powerset of A.
If X is a sieve in ℘ ([0, n]), we can construct a subfunctor [X] of ∆ n by defining If S is a maximal element in a sieve X, and k ∈ S, let horn S,k X be the subset of ℘ ([0, n]) obtained by removing S and S\ {k} from X. Clearly horn S,k X is a sieve as well.
For any S ⊆ [0, n], let (S) denote the set ℘ (S), regarded as a subset of ℘ ([0, n]); clearly, (S) is a sieve, sometimes referred to as the principal sieve generated by S.
Note that, if k ∈ S, the inclusion horn S,k (S) ⊆ (S) is mapped via [−] to a horn inclusion, which is inner if and only if k is internal in S. The inclusion horn S,k X ⊆ X can be regarded as a pushout of the above inclusion, and the corresponding pushout square is also a pullback, hence it is mapped to a pushout of a horn inclusion.
Finally, let Z ⊆ ℘ ([0, n]) be the smallest sieve containing all subsets of the form {i, i + 1}, with 0 ≤ i < n. Clearly, Z is mapped to the spine semi-simplicial pretype Sp n . Therefore, if we set
, our goal is to show that the inclusion Z ⊆ X 0 can be factored through inclusions of the form horn S,h X ⊆ X, with the additional condition that, if k is internal in [0, n], then all the indices h appearing in the factoring inclusions can be chosen to be internal in the corresponding S.
We will proceed by induction on n, the cases for n = 0 and n = 1 being obvious. Assume the conclusion holds for n and lower values, and that n > 1. In particular, given a set S ∈ ℘ ([0, n]) of cardinality less or equal to n, we are able to factor the inclusion Z ∩ (S) ⊆ S as above.
Assume first that k is internal. Let C be the set of all elements S ∈ ℘ ([0, n]) such that k is internal to S. Clearly, C is a cosieve, and it contains [0, n]. Let X 1 be the sieve obtained from ℘ ([0, n]) by repeated applications of horn S,k , for S ∈ C. Since C is a cosieve, we are guaranteed that the above construction is well-defined for any topological decreasing order of the elements of C (e.g. any ordering by decreasing cardinality). In particular, any such ordering has to begin with [0, n], therefore we get that the inclusion X 1 ⊆ X 0 factors through inner horn inclusions as required.
It is easy to check that the sieve X 1 is generated by [0, k] and [k, n], hence we can get to Z using the induction hypothesis twice.
We now tackle the case when k = 0 (the case k = n is entirely analogous). Let C be the cosieve that we get from the above construction for k = n − 1. Note that, since n > 1, the index n − 1 is guaranteed to be internal to [0, n].
As already observed, any topological decreasing ordering of C begins with [0, n], but we are free to choose any set of cardinality n − 1 as its second element. We pick [1, n] , then proceed as above, so we factor the inclusion Z ⊆ ℘ ([0, n]) through horn inclusions. Thanks to our specific choice of ordering on C, we know that the last two inclusions in this chain are precisely:
However, the sieve
coincides with
hence we can replace the last step before ℘ ([0, n]) to get the required chain of inclusions.
Lemma 38. X satisfies the Segal condition if and only if all inner horns have contractible fillers, i.e. X is local with respect to all inner horn inclusions Λ n k → ∆ n , with 0 < k < n.
Proof. Suppose first that X is local with respect to all inner horn inclusions. Then by Lemma 37, it is local with respect to the inclusions Sp n → Λ n n−1 for all n, hence it is also local with respect to the inclusion Sp n → ∆ n . Vice versa, suppose that X satisfies the Segal condition, and let us prove that X is local with respect all inclusions Λ n k → ∆ n , with 0 < k < n, by induction on n. For n = 0 there is nothing to prove. Now assume that the conclusion holds all n < n, and fix any k with 0 < k < n. From the induction hypothesis, and using Lemma 37 again, we get that X is local with respect to the inclusion Sp n → Λ n k . By assumption, X is local with respect to the inclusion Sp n → ∆ n , hence the conclusion follows from the 2-out-of-3 property of equivalences.
In the following, if X is a Reedy fibrant semi-simplicial type, we will use an "indexed" notation to express fibres of X n over an element of the matching object. For example: X 1 (a, b) denotes the fibre of X 1 → M X 1 over the pair (a, b), and X 2 (f, g, h) denotes the fibre of X 2 → M X 2 over the triangle having f, g, h as edges. The Segal condition on Reedy fibrant semi-simplicial types gives us a lot of structure. For example, we get a weakly associative composition:
Definition 39. Let X be a Reedy fibrant semi-Segal type. Let a, b, c : X 0 be vertices, and f : X 1 (a, b) and g : X 1 (b, c) be edges. This data is enough to construct a 2-spine in X. By the Segal condition, we get a whole 2-simplex, of which we can project out an edge X 1 (a, c). We take this edge as the composition g • f . This defines up to homotopy a map _ • _ :
Lemma 40. Suppose given vertices a, b, c of a Reedy fibrant semi-Segal type X, and edges f : X 1 (a, b), g : X 1 (b, c), h : X 1 (a, c). Then we have an equivalence:
Proof. By definition of composition, we know that there exists a 2-simplex t such that (g •f, t) is the centre of contraction of Σ (h : X 1 (a, c) ) . X 2 (f, g, h ). Therefore: 1 (a, c) )
Theorem 41. Composition in a Reedy fibrant semi-Segal type X is associative up to fibrant equality, i.e. for all vertices a, b, c, d : X 0 , and all triple of edges f :
we get an equality:
Proof. By definition of composition, we get a 2-simplex u whose boundary is composed of f , g and g • f . Similarly, we get 2-simplices v and w for the compositions of g, h and g • f , h respectively. The simplices u, v, w fit together into a horn Λ One can check that the last face of t has boundary given by the three edges f , h • g and h • (g • f ), hence we get the required associativity property from Lemma 40.
Similarly to Theorem 41, we believe it is possible to prove higher coherence properties of composition, corresponding to Stasheff associahedra, using the higher Segal conditions. Definition 42 (equivalence). Let a, b be vertices in X, and f : X 1 (a, b). We say that f is an equivalence if, for any vertex c, the maps f • _ : X 1 (b, c) → X 1 (a, c) and _ • f : X 1 (c, a) → X 1 (c, b) are equivalences of types.
Definition 43 (completeness). A Reedy fibrant semi-Segal type X is a complete semi-Segal type if, for every vertex a, the type
For complete semi-Segal types, we believe that the whole degeneracy structure can be constructed, following Harpaz [18] . We only show the first step:
Definition 44 (identities). For a complete semi-Segal type X and a vertex a, we get b and an equivalence f :
is an equivalence and as such has an inverse, which we denote by
We define the identity id a to be i f (f ).
For illustration, we show that composition with id a on either side is equal to the identity:
Theorem 45. For all a, b : X 0 and f : X 1 (a, b), we have f •id a = f and id b •f = f .
Proof. Let h : X 1 (a, c) the equivalence given by the completeness condition of X. Then id a = i h (h). Since h is an equivalence, we can find g :
Again, higher coherence properties are provable for identities, such as the triangle law of bicategories and its higher analogues. However, ad-hoc proofs such as that of Theorem 45 become unweildy very quickly, hence a more systematic approach is required, which would be outside of the scope of this paper.
4.4.
Examples of (Complete) Semi-Segal Types. Constructing semi-Segal types involves defining a semi-simplicial type, then proving the Segal and completeness conditions for it. Since semi-simplicial types involve infinitely many types and some nontrivial amount of combinatorial complexity, carrying out these construction is not always straightforward, even in those cases where the semi-Segal structure is intuitively clear from the inspection of the low-dimensional structure.
One case where constructing a semi-Segal type is nevertheless quite easy is when we are dealing with a strictly associative categorical structure. Recall that a strict category (Definition 7) is given by a pretype of object, a family of morphisms indexed over pairs of objects, and composition and identity operations satisfying laws up to strict equality.
Given a strict category C, we define the nerve N (C) of C as a semi-simplicial type in the usual way: N (C) n is the pretype of all strict functors Fin n+1 → C, where Fin n+1 is equipped with the category structure induced by its order.
As defined, it is quite clear that N (C) is a semi-simplicial pretype. However, by expanding the definition of strict functor, one can easily see that
therefore, if C is fibrant, N (C) is a semi-simplicial type by Lemma 3. And in fact, the strict isomorphism (29) also shows that N (C) satisfies the Segal conditions. Of course, N (C) is not in general Reedy fibrant, but we can use Corollary 25 to construct a Reedy fibrant replacement for it. Nervertheless, we cannot say anything about completeness at this generality. Therefore, the nerve construction for a general fibrant strict category does not capture its identity structure. This is not too surprising, since the construction could as well have been performed with a semicategory (i.e. a category-like structure without identities).
However, when we take C to be the strict category U of fibrant types, then completeness does indeed hold. This follows from the following observation:
Lemma 46 (Escardó [17] ). A universe V of fibrant types is univalent if and only if, for all types A : V, the type
Proof. For all types A, B : V, Let φ : A = B → A ∼ = B be the coercion map, so that V is univalent if and only if φ is an equivalence. Fix A : V, and consider the diagram:
The function ψ maps a pair (B, p) to the pair (B, φ(p)), and the diagonal maps are projections. Now, V is univalent if and only if ψ is a fibrewise equivalence; since the diagram commutes (strictly, even), this is equivalent to ψ being an equivalence.
But the top left type is a singleton, hence contractible, therefore univalence of V is equivalent to the contractibility of the top right type, as claimed.
Corollary 47. Let TYPE be the Reedy fibrant replacement of N (U). Then TYPE is a complete semi-Segal type.
Proof. Vertices of TYPE are types in U, and edges are functions. A simple verification shows that an edge is an equivalence if and only it is an equivalence as a function. Completeness then follows immediately from Lemma 46.
Other examples of semi-Segal type are not as straightforward to define. Developing enough theory of complete semi-Segal types to be able to perform categorical constructions such as slice and comma categories is outside of the scope of this paper. However, we show one more simple example to illustrate the generality of our approach: the complete semi-Segal type of pointed types and pointed maps, written TYPE • .
A pointed type is a type with a point, i.e. an element of Σ (A : U) . A (let us write U • for this), and a pointed map between (A, a) and (B, b) is a function preserving the point, i.e. an element of Σ (f :
Extending these definitions to a full semi-Segal type is quite tricky. The reason is that composition of pointed maps is not associative up to strict equality, hence TYPE • is not a strict category, and the nerve construction above cannot be used. Associativity of composition of pointed maps does indeed hold up to fibrant equality, but that is unfortunately not sufficient.
The following construction is due to Thorsten Altenkirch. The "spine" version of TYPE • , still written S TYPE• , can be defined directly. As explained, we cannot use the naive construction and define S
TYPE• n+2
to be Adapting the nerve construction for strict categories, we might be tempted to define N (U • ) n as follows:
but that would not work, since face maps would not satisfy the functor laws strictly. However, we observe that, by n-fold "singleton contraction", the type (30) is equivalent to
Note that the only difference between the type (31) and N (U) n is the component x 0 . Thus, all we need do is to add a single point to the original (non-pointed) type.
Example 48 (Semi-Segal type TYPE • (Altenkirch)). We define N (U • ) as given by (31). This gives us an actual diagram, since we only need composition of ordinary (non-pointed) functions, which is strictly associative. We then take the Reedy fibrant replacement to construct the semi-Segal type TYPE • . Again, completeness follows from univalence.
There is a canonical map TYPE • → TYPE which is of some importance (although not in the current paper): it can be seen as a universe for "left fibrations". As such, one might want this map to be a Reedy fibration. Unfortunately, this is not the case with our construction. In order to achieve this, a further factorisation as constructed in Lemma 24 is required.
4.5. The Special Case of ∞-Groupoids. A semi-Segal type is defined as a semi-simplicial type satisfying the Segal condition. Thanks to Lemma 37, this is equivalent to requiring contractible horn-fillers for all inner horns. An even stronger condition is to ask for locality with respect to all horns. In this case, we speak of ∞-groupoids:
Definition 49 (∞-groupoid). An ∞-groupoid is a semi-simplicial type X that is local with respect to all horn inclusions Λ n k → ∆ n .
As in the familiar case of Kan complexes (i.e. simplicial sets satisfying a horn filling condition), one can show, with exactly the same proof, that ∞-groupoid do indeed behave like groupoids.
Lemma 50. Every edge of an ∞-groupoid X is an equivalence.
Corollary 51. Every ∞-groupoid X is a complete semi-Segal type.
Proof. It follows from Lemma 38 that X is local with respect spine inclusions. Since all edges in X are equivalences by Lemma 50, completeness is equivalent to locality with respect to one of the 1-horn inclusions
Conversely, to make an ∞-groupoid out of a complete semi-Segal type, all we need is that its edges are all equivalences.
Lemma 52. Let X be a complete semi-Segal type where all edges are equivalences. Then X is an ∞-groupoid.
Proof. We know from Lemma 38 that X is local with respect to inner horn inclusions. Therefore, all we need to check is that X is local with respect to inclusions Λ n k → ∆ n , where k = 0 or k = n. We proceed by induction on n. The case n = 0 follows immediately from completeness and the fact that every edge is an equivalence. For the inductive step, Lemma 37 implies that X is local with respect to the inclusion Sp n → Λ n k . By assumption, X is local with respect to Sp n → ∆ n , hence the conclusion follows from the 2-out-of-3 property of equivalences.
Since the fibrant equality of types naturally carries an infinite dimensional structure, we can associate an ∞-groupoid in the sense of Definition 49 to any type.
Lemma 53. Let X be a fibrant type. The Reedy fibrant replacement of the constant functor on X is an ∞-groupoid.
Proof. It follows immediately from the contractibility of singletons that the constant functor on X satisfies the Segal condition, hence so does its fibrant replacement Y , by Lemma 36. One can check very easily that composition in Y corresponds to the usual composition of equalities, hence we get every edge is an equivalence. Completeness is immediate. Therefore, Y is an ∞-groupoid by Lemma 52.
Formalisation
We have striven to present all results in a way that is close to a potential formalisation. With a proof assistant that implements our two-level theory, one would thus be able to mechanise the results of the paper rather directly, or at least similarly directly as papers with purely internal results can be implemented in current proof assistants: of course, there is always still some work to do because some low-level steps are omitted in informal presentations. As we do not have such a proof assistant at hand, the task is to implement two level type theory in conventional proof assistants reusing as much features as possible.
An overall idea of an approach to implementation that is suitable for most existing proof assistants is the following. We work in a type theory with universes of "strict" types (i.e. where uip holds). Pretypes correspond to the ordinary types of the proof assistant and (fibrant) types are represented as pretypes "tagged" with the extra property of being fibrant. The role of our strict equality is played by the ordinary propositional equality of the proof assistant (which, thanks to uip, is indeed propositional in the sense of HoTT). The fibrant equality type is postulated together with its elimination rule J. We further postulate fibrancy preservation rules for Π and Σ as they are given in 2.1. The usual computation rule for J is defined using strict equality. 5.1. Our Lean Development. The proof assistant Lean [16] , which we have chosen for our formalisation, 3 can operate in two different "modes": one with a built-in uip, and one which is suitable for HoTT. Our Lean implementation is based on the former, "strict", Lean mode. Fibrant types are implemented as a record type Fib with two fields: a pretype, and the property that it is fibrant. The is_fibrant property is defined using the type class mechanism provided by the language. Lean coercions are used to implement the rule that every fibrant type is also a pretype.
The presentation of fibrant types using type classes results in a very elegant implementation of the fibrant type theory. The class instance resolution mechanism allows us to leave the property of being fibrant implicit in most cases. We use Fib in definitions and let Lean insert coercions automatically in places where a pretype is expected, or where a witness that a type is fibrant is required.
It is worth pointing out, however, that in our formalisation we do not make a distinction between fibrant and essentially fibrant pretypes, having instead a single predicate is_fibrant to express this property. That is, every type which is strictly isomorphic to a fibrant type is also considered fibrant by the axiom we postulate in our implementation. This makes the development more convenient as long as we use essentialy fibrant types for most of the results presented in the current formalisation. For instance, Theorem 15 and a number of auxiliary lemmas for this theorem involve essentialy fibrant types.
To show how to work with the fibrant type theory, we have formalised some simple facts from the HoTT library. Our implementation shows that many proofs can be reused almost without change, provided that the same notation is used for basic definitions. For instance, we have ported some theorems about product types with only minor modifications. In particular, induction on fibrant equalities works as expected: we annotate the postulated elimination principle with the [recursor] attribute, and the induction tactic applies this induction principle automatically.
A point to note is that the computation (or β-) rule for the J eliminator of the fibrant equality type is implemented as a strict equality, using the propositional equality of the proof assistant. This means that the rule does not hold judgmentally. Consequently, this computation does a priori not happen automatically, and explicit rewrites along the propositional β-rules are needed in proof implementations. This and other issues of the same kind are addressed by using one of Lean's proof automation features. We annotate all the "computational" rules with the attribute [simp]. This attribute is used to guide Lean's simplification tactic simp which performs reductions in the goal according to the base of available simplification rules. That allows us to use a simple proof pattern: do induction on relevant equalities and then apply the simp tactic. However, the simp tactic is not a welldocumented feature of Lean. Sometimes it fails to simplify goals, and in such cases we apply repeated rewrites using propositional computation rules.
There is another issue which arises, particularly, when defining propositional β-rules for equality-dependent definitions. For example, for apd we would like to have the following equation: apd f refl x s = refl (f x) , but this term is not well-typed, since the left-hand side of the equation has type refl x (f x) = f x, while the right-hand side has type f x = f x, where stand for transport along the fibrant equality. In order to make this definition well-typed we have to explicitly apply the propositional computation rule for transport. This leads to the following equation: transportβ (f x) s (apd f refl x ) s = refl f x , where s denotes transport along the strict equality, i.e. Lean's propositional equality (we could have transported the right-hand side instead). Writing definitions like that is inconvenient, but there is a way to avoid this. We can define propositional β-rules only for some basic cases (like transport) and unfold definitions in proofs to the form when these basic rules can be applied. We tested this strategy while porting some theorems about Σ-types from the Lean's HoTT library. In general, this issue could appear in more complex cases than those we have investigated; it is similar to the problem appearing in axiomatic definitions of higher inductive types in Coq [7] , where the proposed solution was to use private inductive types (see 5.2).
As we are working in strict Lean, we have decided to use the existing formalisation of category theory from the standard library. Unfortunately, it is not as developed as the formalisation in HoTT Lean. For that reason, additional effort is needed to formalise some concepts from category theory required for the results given in the paper.
In the current implementation, besides the general two level framework, we have implemented the machinery required to define Reedy fibrant diagrams and have fully formalised a proof of Theorem 15. In particular, our implementation includes a definition of reduced coslice category, inverse diagrams, matching objects, along with the general categorical definitions of limits and the construction of limits in the category of pretypes, which, as far as we are aware, cannot be found in the Lean standard library.
The formalisation of Theorem 15 closely follows the structure given in the paper. One of the central parts of the proof was a transformation of the limit of a Reedy fibrant diagram through the chain of isomorphisms. In our Lean formalisation, it is implemented using the calc environment which gives a very convenient way of chaining transitive steps. It is also interesting to note that proving some facts which seem obvious on paper, such as that removing a maximal object from a finite inverse category C preserves required properties, turned out to be quite a laborious task.
Our Lean development should still be considered a proof of concept, as it does not fully implement all the results presented in the paper. However, we hope that it serves as a compelling demonstration of the feasibility of our formalisation approach.
5.2. The Boulier-Tabareau Coq Development. Boulier and Tabareau [11] have implemented a theory with two equalities in the Coq proof assistant [10] . It uses an approach that is somewhat similar to our own development of two-level type theory. In particular, the authors use Coq type classes to track fibrant types and exploit the corresponding features of the type class resolution mechanism to derive fibrancy automatically. However, there are some differences in the details of how the fibrant equality type is implemented.
In our Lean development we postulate a fibrant equality type and the equality eliminator, while in [11] the authors define it as a private inductive type [9] . This feature of the Coq proof assistant allows one to define an inductive type so that no eliminators are generated and no pattern-matching is allowed outside of the module where this type is defined. Exposing a custom induction principle for such a private inductive type allows one to retain computational behaviour, while restricting the user to explicitly provided eliminators.
Although such an implementation has some advantages, like making more proofs compute, it relies on specific implementation details. In the current version of Coq, private inductive definitions are still an experimental extension. The authors of [11] had to use a custom rewrite tactic implemented in OCaml in order to fix an incorrect behaviour of the private definition under the standard Coq rewriting tactic.
Our development in Lean could be seen as more explicit and straightforward approach to the implementation of a two-level type theory, and the simplicity of the encoding of fibrancy constraints makes it potentially more portable to different systems, as long as they are equipped with a powerful enough type class resolution mechanism.
5.3. Experience with Agda. Our choice of Lean as the language for the formalisation of this paper has been a consequence of a failed attempt at embedding two-level type theory in the Agda proof assistant [23] .
Analogously to the development that has been eventually realised in Lean, our plan was to consider Agda's underlying theory, which includes uip, as the strict fragment of our two-level type theory, and use instance arguments, which are Agda's implementation of type classes, to express fibrancy conditions on pretypes.
Unfortunately, due to the way instance and implicit arguments get resolved in Agda, we were not able to get automatic propagation of fibrancy conditions over type expressions involving families of types, such as Π or Σ types.
It appears that the problem is caused by the fact that the unification that takes place in Agda's internals while implicit arguments are being resolved is much "stricter" than in Lean, and in many cases it fails to find solutions that the latter would able to produce.
We therefore considered alternative approaches, such as postulating a universe of fibrant types and the corresponding type formers. Using a certain trick suggested by Thorsten Altenkirch, one can make sure that the fibrant type formers agree with the primitive ones. The trick is similar to the one that allows higher inductive types with judgemental reduction rules to be implemented in Agda [14] .
However, it appeared that such an approach, although probably feasible, is not as convenient and immediate as the solution based on type-class that we eventually settled with in Lean, so we abandoned it.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed two-level type theory, a unified system that combines set-level reasoning based on strict equalities like traditional Martin-Löf type theory including the principle of uniqueness of identity proofs, with the additional features of homotopy type theory, including univalent universes (thus the ability to reason up to homotopy equivalence of types) and possibly higher inductive types.
We demonstrated that this approach can be used effectively to express, within the familiar language of type theory, constructions that before could be performed only meta-theoretically, such as the construction of a type of (n-truncated) semisimplicial types, and the beginning of an internal development of a theory of (∞, 1)-categories. We showed how two-level type theory can be encoded in a proof assistant that is based on some form of strict type theory, specifically the Lean proof assistant, by using type classes to keep track of and automatically propagate fibrancy constraints.
We believe two-level type theory to be a suitable framework for expressing and proving results in HoTT that involve an infinite number of coherence conditions. As future work, we plan to expand our exploration of what is possible to achieve in two-level type theory, using what we covered in this paper as a starting point.
Possible directions include developing a rich theory of (∞, 1)-categories that includes standard constructions such as homotopy limits, and, potentially based on that, a language for the definition of higher inductive types generalising the existing specification of QIITS [2] .
